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Executive Summary
Quantitative easing (QE) affects banks’ profitability in three main ways. 
1. First, as QE drives up bond prices, banks holding such bonds see their balance sheets 
strengthened. 
2. Second, QE reduces long-term yields and thereby reduces term spreads. With this, the 
lending-deposit ratio spread falls, making it harder for banks to generate net interest 
income on new loans. 
3. Last, QE improves the economic outlook, which should help banks exposed to the econ-
omy find new lending opportunities and should reduce problems with non-performing 
loans. The effects of QE on bank profitability are therefore not one directional. If anything, 
the immediate effect should be positive. 
Banks themselves have been quite negative about the impact of QE on their net interest 
income, but they have also acknowledged its positive impact on capital gains (ECB Bank 
Lending Survey). 
We show that lending-deposit spreads for new lending have fallen significantly. Looking 
at actual bank profits, net interest income has been stable. Moreover, bank profitability has 
increased mostly as a result of efforts to clean balance sheets of impaired assets (at least until 
the end of 2015). This is consistent with a reduction in non-performing loans (NPLs), particu-
larly in countries where NPL levels were abnormally high. 
Moreover, we show that bank profitability in some countries has been a concern for many 
years now, starting well before the QE programme. The main drivers of low profitability have 
been non-performing loans, legal risks and other problems unrelated to net interest income, 
which has remained fairly stable.
Overall, we cannot yet see any major bank profitability issue arising out of the ECB’s QE 
programme. 
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1. Introduction
European Central Bank policy is and remains controversial. Since the start of the crisis, the 
ECB’s balance sheet has increased three-fold. The quantitative easing (QE) programme that 
started in the second quarter of 2015 increased the size of the ECB’s balance sheet to 117 
percent of GDP1. Beyond the risks arising from sovereign bond holdings, the debate on QE 
mainly centres on four aspects. The first is the question of whether the programme actually 
contributes to inflation. The second is the question of when is the right moment to end it, 
irrespective of whether it actually works. Third, there is an important debate about whether 
QE unduly ‘dispossesses’ savers. Finally, there is the question of whether QE should be ended 
earlier because of its impact on financial stability and, in particular, the profitability of banks 
and insurers. Depending on the weight given to each of these four aspects and how they are 
assessed, different conclusions have been drawn regarding ECB policy. This paper focuses 
on the fourth aspect and in particular the impact on banks2. In the introduction, we briefly 
review a few arguments around the first three aspects.
There is a surprisingly broad consensus about the effectiveness of the ECB’s QE pro-
gramme. Studies have documented the positive impact on prices of assets and the reduction 
and flattening of yield curves, and have also cautiously found support for a positive impact on 
investment and consumption (see, for example, German Council of Economic Advisors, 2016; 
Praet, 2016; Draghi, 2016; Demertzis and Wolff, 2016)3. And indeed, since the announcement 
and start of QE, growth has picked up, the main contributors being gross capital formation 
and household expenditure (see charts in the Annex).
There is less consensus on the right moment to exit the programme. The German Council 
of Economic Advisors (2016) argues that the ECB should taper its Asset Purchase Programme 
(APP) and that the current monetary policy position is no longer appropriate for economic 
conditions. Inflation measures such as the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
might provide an inaccurate picture because of volatile energy prices and, moreover, financial 
stability risks are high. By contrast, the latest CFM4 survey results show that 77 percent of 
macroeconomists disagreed or strongly disagreed with the view that “…exceptionally loose 
monetary policy by the European Central Bank is no longer appropriate”. Figure 1 illustrates 
that HICP and core inflation remain very low compared to the ECB’s inflation goal, so that 
further monetary support is warranted. 
There is less of an academic debate on the “expropriation of savings”5 because this is a 
mostly politically driven issue. By its very nature, monetary policy will have an impact on 
the relative wealth of savers and investors. An unexpected decrease in the interest rate is an 
effective policy tool for the ECB because it does make savings less attractive and investments 
more attractive. This question therefore ultimately becomes a question of why nominal yields 
are relatively low and whether the ECB has reacted to that low-yield environment or is the 
1  See Figure A1 in the Annex. The APP/PSPP (Asset Purchase Programme, Public Sector Purchase Programme) share 
in the balance sheet amounts to about 35 percentage points. The Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) 
amounts to very little by comparison. Nevertheless, the corporate sector has responded to the programme and the 
issuance of corporate bonds has picked up.
2  The European Parliament requested that the study focus on the impact on banks.
3  See Marx et al (2016) for a comprehensive summary of the latest attempts to quantify the effects. Efforts to quantify 
the impact show that effects are material.  Andrade et al (2016) estimate a maximum effect on inflation of 0.35 percent 
and 0.6 percent on the level of GDP (original APP only ie early PSPP). Cova et al (2015) are more optimistic, with the 
effects being 0.8 percent and 1.4 percent on inflation and the level of GDP respectively. Praet (2016) and Draghi (2016) 
evaluate all QE up to the time of writing to have had an impact of 0.5 percent on average annual inflation for the 
period between 2015 and 2018. The cumulative effect on GDP for the same period is 1.6 percent. See also Claeys and 
Leandro (2016) for an early assessment.
4  http://cfmsurvey.org/. The latest thinking of European macroeconomists German Council of Economic Experts’ 
view of ECB policy Monday, November 7, 2016.
5  Term used in German media (see for example Bindseil, 2015)
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primary driver of it. The recent increase in long-term yields is one sign that political decisions, 
the amount of public investment and the expectations of market participants can quickly 
increase long-term yields, despite continued central bank action. We have argued elsewhere 
that perhaps more important than continuous central banking activity are structural and 
investment policies that lift long-term growth prospects and thereby drive up real returns 
(Wolff, 2015; Claeys, 2016)6. 
On the impact of monetary policy on bank profitability and bank balance sheets, there is 
an increasing literature on the channels at work and the empirical evidence7. Three theo-
retical channels can be identified: the impact of monetary policy on net interest income, on 
non-interest income and on loan loss provisions. There are good arguments that both the 
level and the shape of the yield curve can have a major impact on interest margins. In addi-
tion, QE has an immediate effect on bond prices, supporting banks that hold sovereign bonds. 
Finally, there are various macroeconomic feedback channels because QE should support 
the economy, thereby reducing NPL rates and reducing the need for provisioning. It would 
go beyond the scope of this briefing to discuss all the channels in detail, but a summary is 
provided in the Annex.
Figure 1: Inflation and inflation expectations (%)
Source: European Central Bank and Bloomberg. Measures of expectations: Survey of Professional Forecasters and 5-year Inflation Linked 
Swap rates. Notes: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’8; 2) Announcement of PSPP; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
2. Assessing the effects of monetary policy 
on bank profitability in the euro area
The spread between long- and short-term bond yields is important for bank profitability 
as banks engage in maturity transformation. This spread should have narrowed following 
the start of QE (PSPP), but it should be acknowledged that it is also influenced by forward 
6  Available at http://bruegel.org/2015/11/schriftliche-stellungnahme-bundestagsanhorung-niedrigzinspoli-
tik-der-ezb/ and http://bruegel.org/2016/09/low-long-term-rates-bond-bubble-or-symptom-of-secular-stagnation/.
7  See for example, Agur and Demertzis (2015) for a summary of the literature; Alessandrini and Nelson (2012) for the 
overall effect of the yield curve on bank profitability; Borio et al (2015) also provide a detailed discussion of various 
channels.  
8  Refers to the speech given by Mario Draghi on the willingness of the ECB to act, now known as the “whatever it 
takes” speech.
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guidance and expectations of conventional monetary policy. Term spreads fell from very high 
levels in the periphery countries during 2013 and 2014 (Figure 2), but have increased since 
the announcement and start of QE9. Since the ECB announcement of the expansion of the 
PSPP and the March 2016 decision to include corporate bonds, term spreads have been on a 
declining, though volatile, path. However, in the latter part of 2016, term spreads increased 
again. Broadly speaking they have regained the same level as at the start of QE. It is difficult 
therefore to discern a strong and lasting effect of QE on the term spread. 
Figure 2: Government bond term spreads (10 year yields – 1 year yields) (%)
Source: Bloomberg. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 8); 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
Figure 3: Lending-deposit rate spread on new credit, euro area by sector (%)
Source: European Central Bank. Notes: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 8); 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and 
expansion of PSPP. Spread NFCs: Loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, Total initial 
rate fixation, Total amount, New business coverage, Non-Financial corporations (S.11) sector, denominated in euro; Overnight deposits, 
Total original maturity, New business coverage, Non-Financial corporations (S.11) sector, denominated in euro. Spread HHs: Lending 
for house purchase excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, Total initial rate fixation, New 
business coverage, Households and non-profit institutions serving households (S.14 and S.15) sector, denominated in euro; Overnight 
deposits, Total original maturity, New business coverage, Households and non-profit institutions serving households (S.14 and S.15) 
sector, denominated in euro.
9  The uncertainty relating to negotiations with Greece in the summer of 2015 may be the explanation for that.
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Profits are affected when the lending-deposit rate spread narrows, as banks borrow short 
term (typically through deposits) to invest in long-term assets. The lending-deposit rate, and 
therefore the margin for banks to make profits, continues to decline. For the euro area as a 
whole, this reduction in the lending-deposit rate is visible for new lending to households and 
the non-financial corporate sector (Figure 3). In terms of new lending, the lending-deposit 
spread in September 2016 amounted to 1.77 percent for households and 1.55 percent for 
non-financial corporations. 
Nevertheless, the impact on total profitability depends also on the number of loans issued. 
Loans to households continue to grow at a rate of two percent and loans to non-financial 
corporations are now starting to show a positive growth rate (see Figure A4 in the Annex).  
Quantitative easing also affects asset prices through what is known as the ‘portfolio bal-
ance’ channel. As banks sell these assets to the central bank, they reallocate the cash obtained 
to riskier assets in order to generate greater profits. But the immediate effect of quantitative 
easing on bank profitability is known as the ‘scarcity effect’ (Montecino and Epstein, 2014). As 
securities of different maturities are imperfect substitutes, the increase in the central bank’s 
demand for long-term securities should make them less available in the market and should 
therefore also increase their price (all things being equal). This effect is possible because the 
central bank is a large player that aims to use QE to shift bank incentives. Montecino and 
Epstein (2014) assessed the level of profitability of US banks that sold directly to the Fed as 
part of the Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) programme10. They found that by comparison 
to banks that were not part of LSAP, their profitability went up by 0.35 of a percentage point. 
This is economically a significant number in an era when profitability hovers around zero. 
3. Bank profitability: perceptions and facts
The arguments so far imply that the total effects of QE on bank profitability are threefold:
1. Positive effect: scarcity effect through an increase in capital gains;
2. Negative effect: lowering and flattening of the yield curve leads to lower opportunities for 
profits arising from lending – deposit rate spread;
3. Finally, improved macro conditions increase the demand for credit and the quality of 
credit, benefitting banks.
But what does the data on bank profitability actually show and how do banks perceive the 
current situation?
In its regular Bank Lending Survey, the ECB asks banks how they perceive the impact of QE on 
their profitability. Figure 4 shows that since the end of 2015 banks in the euro area have on average 
taken an increasingly negative view about their ability to generate profits, because of QE.
The banks also acknowledge that capital gains are positive (the first effect) but consider 
this to be outweighed by the negative effect on net interest margins (thus the total is negative 
in Figure 4). It would be important to see whether these perceptions match reality.
10  Data shows that the ECB did not buy these assets from domestic banks with the exception of Spain (Hüttl and 
Merler, 2016).
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Figure 4: Impact of the expanded APP on euro area banks’ profitability 
Source: Bank Lending survey, ECB (results of surveys in April and October, 2015, 2016). Notes: The y-axis shows the difference between 
the share of ‘increase/improve considerable/somewhat’ responses and ‘decrease/deteriorate considerably/somewhat’ responses11. 
Answer to the question 130: “Over the past six months, has the ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme led to a change in your bank’s 
assets or affected (either directly or indirectly) your bank profitability? Is it likely to have an impact here over the next six months?”.
3.1   A closer examination of bank profitability
On average, banks use deposits to fund their loans. Since deposits are short-term whereas 
loans mature over the long-term, banks rely on the term structure to generate profits. As 
we have shown, the term spread has narrowed and so has the loan-to-deposit spread. 
Accordingly, we would expect lower profits from standard bank lending.
The ECB publishes aggregate, consolidated data on banks’ profitability, balance, sheets, 
asset quality, liquidity and solvency. Banks’ total profits, as well as those relating to operations 
and strictly interest income-generating business, are the most relevant indicators. We 
consider two main profit indicators: i) total profit before tax; and ii) operating profit. The 
difference between the two indicators is that the former includes credit loss expenses and 
impairment losses on financial investment, in addition to operating profit. Furthermore, 
we break down operating profit into its constituent parts (Figure 5), specifically net interest 
income, the main item relating to the lending-deposit spread, and other categories, namely, 
net commission and fee income, operating expenses and a residual. The difference between 
operating profits and total profits (allowances/provisions for credit losses arising from 
bad debts, ie an estimate of the debt that is unlikely to be recovered) is indicative of the 
deteriorating quality of credit that affected bank balance sheets during the crisis.
Figure 5 shows that net interest income and operating profits have been fairly stable. Net 
interest income is the variable that should be directly affected by the documented decline in 
the term spreads. It is surprising that nothing is visible in the aggregate data. There could be 
two reasons for this. First, a falling term spread (and loan-deposit spread) only applies to new 
loans. Since loan growth is weak, this would mostly affect the rolling-over of existing loans. 
The low spread therefore only gradually feeds into net interest income. Moreover, it is possible 
that banks increasingly manage to compensate for the falling spread through fee increases 
(loan origination fees, net of loan origination costs, are recognised as interest). Second, banks 
have been able to successfully profit generation to the QE environment.
11  The data used to compute the differences consists of weighted average frequencies of five responses based on the 
share of each country in the total loan outstanding amounts of the area aggregate and of each bank in the total loan 
outstanding amount of the BLS banks sample. The sample group comprises about 140 banks from all euro-area coun-
tries and takes intoaccount the characteristics of each country’s national banking system.
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Figure 5: Bank profitability, euro area (% of total assets)
Source: European Central Bank, consolidated banking data. Note: Definition of bank size based on assets as a percentage of total consol-
idated assets of EU banks – Large (greater than 0.5 percent), Medium-sized (between 0.5 percent and 0.005 percent), Small (less than 
0.005 percent).
Figure 6: Bank profitability, euro area (% of total assets), quarterly profile with 
latest data (up to Q2 2016)
Source: SNL Financial, Bruegel calculations.
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Figure 7: Bank profitability (selected countries) (% of total assets)
Source: European Central Bank, consolidated banking data.
Nevertheless, total profits have been volatile and at times negative. Medium-sized banks 
appear to have been hit hardest in this respect. The main drivers of this volatility and the 
losses have been losses arising from provisioning for non-performing loans,which accounts 
for the difference between the two types of profits shown. Legal costs are categorised as 
operating expenses and are therefore part of the operating profit. Figure 5 shows that euro-
area banks, irrespective of size, have made progress in reducing the burden arising from loss 
provisioning. In the case of small banks, this gap has even been eliminated.
The second quarter 2016 data on bank profitability12 confirms that net interest income 
remains stable and total profits have even recovered (Figure 6). 
A closer look reveals some differences between countries in terms of total profits before 
taxes (Figure 7). In particular, the data confirms that profitability is in particular low in Ger-
many (0.34 percent of total assets in 2015) and Italy (0.29 percent). However, as already noted, 
net interest income (and operating profits) have remained very stable over time in all coun-
tries. What has changed is total profits over tax, which reflects the quality of credit on banks’ 
12  This data covers 36 of the 129 banks supervised by the ECB, representing 32 percent of consolidated euro-area banking 
assets in 2015. We look at a group of stable composition, even if incomplete, to ensure comparability.
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balance sheets. We see that Italy and Spain, the two countries among the five we consider 
that have the greatest number of non-performing loans (Figure A.5 in the Annex), have seen 
negative profitability. 
The aggregate macroeconomic pictures could give a distorted picture because they do 
not capture bank-specific developments. In Figure 8, we therefore examine the distribution 
of profitability of banks since before the financial crisis13. We observe that during the years 
of the crisis the difference in profits earned by banks has become greater, with an increasing 
number of banks reporting negative profits. This trend however is starting to reverse as the 
variability of profits is now decreasing and profits appear more concentrated again. There 
does not appear any sizeable shift of average profits over time.
Figure 8: Bank profitability 2006-15
Source: SNL Financial, Bruegel calculations.
Conclusions
• The ECB’s policy has been heavily criticised for different reasons. One of the most fre-
quently voiced criticisms is that its policy is undermining the profitability of banks. As a 
consequence, according to this argument, ECB policy itself would become less effective 
because weak banks will shy away from lending and will not engage in new lending if 
deposit-to-lending spreads are low.
• The lending-deposit spread has fallen significantly for new lending and is now as low as 
1.55 percent and 1.77 percent for new lending to companies and households. This corre-
sponds to banks’ replies to the ECB’s bank lending survey, which finds that they consider 
13  56 banks of the 129 supervised by the ECB which represents 70 percent of consolidated euro area banking assets in 2015. 
We look at a group of stable composition, even if incomplete, to ensure comparability.
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that the APP is negatively affecting their net interest margins. However, there are also 
differences between countries.
• A look at the aggregate bank profitability figures, however, shows that banks’ net interest 
income has been extraordinarily stable and has not (yet) fallen as a result of QE. Total 
profits in different countries vary significantly. Such differences are mostly explained 
by provisioning for non-performing loans. Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks also 
have been able to raise fees to compensate for falling interest margins.
• Finally, QE has overall positive macroeconomic effects and its announcement has 
lowered long-term yields and, correspondingly, increased sovereign bond prices. Both 
effects support bank balance sheets by improving the economic outlook.
• Overall, in our assessment, the effect of the ECB’s QE programme on bank profitabili-
ty has not yet had a dramatically negative effect on bank operations. In the future, the 
ECB might want to consider steps comparable to the Bank of Japan, which has aimed to 
increase the steepness of the yield curve to support long-term yields (above 10 and in 
particular 15 years and more). The ECB would have to evaluate the extent to which such 
higher long-term yields would deter current investment and benefit banks and insurers.
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Annex A: QE and its macroeconomic effects
Figure A1 shows the evolution of the ECB’s balance sheet since its inception. The yellow 
shaded area shows the effects of QE on the total amount held. It corresponds to about a 
third of the current total.
Figure A1: ECB’s balance sheet as percentage of euro area GDP 
Source: Eurostat, ECB (insert shows how littleCorporate Sector Purchase Programme amounts to up to October 2016).
Figure A2 shows an updated graph for GDP growth in the euro area and its contributors. 
Gross fixed capital formation and household consumption remain the two main drivers of 
current growth.
We see in Figures A3 and A4 that both gross fixed capital formation and lending have 
been consistently improving since the start of QE. More specifically, lending to non-financial 
corporations has been falling steadily since 2012, only to stabilise in the second half of 2015 
following the start of the PSPP. Lending to households has held more robustly, and has indeed 
increased since the announcement of the PSPP: from a yearly growth of around 0% to one of 
2%. This credit took mostly the form of mortgages which was helped by the stabilisation or 
even increase in house prices. Credit, therefore, has been important in reversing and sustain-
ing the contributions of consumption and investment to growth.
Figure A5 shows the progress made in terms of dealing with impaired assets at the EU 
level. We observe that Spain had both a lower level of NPLs and has managed to implement 
the reforms made. Italy has a much larger amount of impaired assets and has been slow to 
implement successfully these reforms. The other three countries, (Germany, France and the 
Netherlands) have not had levels of NPLs that affected their profitability.
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Figure A2: Contributions to real GDP growth (growth contribution, %)
Source: Eurostat. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 5); 2) Announcement of PPP; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
Figure A3: Euro area gross fixed capital formation (real year-on-year growth, %)
Source: Eurostat and European Central Bank. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 5); 2) PSPP Announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) 
CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
Figure A4: Loans to households and non-financial corporations (year-on-year 
growth, %)
Source: Eurostat and European Central Bank. Note: 1) ‘Whatever it takes’ (see footnote 5); 2) PSPP Announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) 
CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
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Figure A5: Gross non-performing debt instruments, % of total gross debt 
instruments
Source: European Central Bank. Note: peak year to 2016Q1.
Annex B: The channels through which QE 
affects the economy
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) have outlined the different channels through 
which Quantitative Easing (QE) may affect medium and long-term interest rates. The seven 
theoretical channels are summarised below.
• The signalling channel concerns expectations on future actions of the Central Bank. It 
predicts that long-term bond yields will reduce should unconventional monetary policy 
be perceived as a credible commitment. A large purchase of long-term assets may signal 
that commitment, as a future raise in interest rates would imply losses for the central 
bank. This impact is expected to be larger on intermediate-maturity rates.
• Quantitative easing can reduce the duration risk, causing a decrease in long-maturity 
bond yields relative to short-maturity yields. The duration risk channel anticipates 
that QE will decrease the yield on all long-term nominal assets, with larger effects on 
longer-duration assets.
• By trading less liquid long-term securities for more liquid reserve balances, QE increases 
liquidity for investors, reducing the liquidity premium. The liquidity channel thus pre-
dicts that QE increases yields on the most liquid assets relative to other less liquid assets. 
• The safety channel suggests that QE policies involving Treasury and agency bonds lower 
the yields on safe assets relative to less safe assets, such as lower-grade corporate bonds 
or MBSs. By increasing the supply of safe assets, clientele demands for this type of assets 
are met, thus reducing their safety premium. 
• A specific channel is related to the purchase of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) solely. 
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The prepayment risk premium channel implies that QE policy through MBS purchases 
lowers Mortgage Backed Securities yields relative to other bond market yields. This chan-
nel is more relevant for the US than the euro area.
• The default risk channel addresses the reduction of default risk and default risk pre-
mium motivated by the spurring effects of unconventional monetary policy in eco-
nomic activity. Under these conditions, it is expected that default risk of companies 
will decrease, leading to a decrease in rates. A reduction in investor risk aversion is also 
expectable, with a negative impact on default risk premium. 
• Finally, Quantitative Easing may impact the real economy via the inflation channel, as 
the possible expansionary effects of QE can increase inflation expectations.
The authors note that, as a given interest rate may be affected through a variety of chan-
nels, one cannot infer the overall effect of QE from examining a specific asset type.
